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I.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
This matter is a "slip and fall" case which arises from a lawsuit filed by Irina Shea

against the Kevic Corporation d/b/a/ Lett's Downtown Carwash and which stems from
an incident that occurred on January 22, 2011 when Ms. Shea fell while on the
premises of the carwash and was injured.

(In accordance with I.R.A. 35(d), the

Appellant will hereinafter be referred to as "Shea" and the Respondent will hereinafter
be referred to "Kevic.") Shea filed a lawsuit against Kevic for negligence. Kevic filed a
Motion for Summary Judgment on the grounds that Ms. Shea testified that the ground
where she fell was dry and that she did not know what caused her to fall. Further, there
is no evidence that Kevic had any knowledge of the alleged dangerous condition. The
District Court granted Kevic's Motion for Summary Judgment. Shea filed two Motions
for Reconsideration, both of which were denied by the District Court.
B. Course of Proceedings.
Shea's Complaint was filed on November 14, 2011.

Kevic's filed a Motion for

Summary Judgment on June 21, 2012 along with supporting Memorandum and an
Affidavit of Chris H. Hansen. (Augmented Record, hereinafter referred to as "AR"). AR
Doc. No.1, pp. 6 - 22/148. On August 2, 2012, Shea filed a response to Kevic's Motion
for Summary Judgment and an Affidavit of Henry Madsen. (AR Doc No.4, pp. 23 - 39).
On August 10, 2012, Kevic filed a Motion to Strike Portions of the Affidavit of Henry
Madsen, along with a supporting Memorandum. (AR, Doc. No.7, pp. 51 -57.)
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On August 23, 2012, the District Court conducted a hearing pertaining to Kevic's
Motion for Summary Judgment and granted the Summary Judgment Motion and Kevic's
Motion to Strike Portions of the Affidavit of Henry Madsen. TR 1- 23.

A written Order

reflecting the District Court's decisions was entered on September 5, 2012. (CR 27 31.) (Clerk's Record hereinafter is referenced as "CR") Both decisions by the District
Court are being appealed by Shea.
On September 5, 2012, Ms. Shea filed a Motion for Reconsideration, supported
by an Affidavit of Irina Shea. (CR 38 - 65.)

On September 14, 2012, Kevic filed a

Motion to Strike Affidavit of Irina Shea and supporting memorandum. (CR 50 - 66.)
During a hearing on October 2, 2012, the Court denied Kevic's Motion to Strike the
Affidavit of Irina Shea and also denied Shea's Motion for Reconsideration. (TR 24 31.) Written Orders documenting the Court's decisions were entered on October 18,
2012. (CR 67.) Ms. Shea is appealing the District Court's denial of the first Motion for
Reconsideration. Kevic is appealing the Court's denial of its Motion to Strike Affidavit of
Irina Shea.
On October 17, 2012, Shea filed a Second Motion for Reconsideration. (AR Doc.
No. 16, pp. 107 - 108.) On October 19, 2012, Kevic filed an Objection to the Second
Motion for Reconsideration and a Motion for an award of Attorney's Fees regarding
Second Motion for Reconsideration pursuant to Rule 11 (a)(1) I.R.C.P. On November 1,
2012, Shea filed a Memorandum in support of the Second Motion for Reconsideration
and a Second Affidavit of Henry Madsen. (AR Doc. Nos. 8 and 9, pp. 112 - 131. In
response

to

Shea's

briefing,

Kevic

filed

a

Memorandum

in

Opposition

RESPONDENTS/CROSS APPELLANT'S RESPONSE AND OPENING BRIEF - 2

to

Plaintiff's Second Motion for Reconsideration and a Motion to Strike portions of Mr.
Madsen's Affidavit dated November 1, 2012 and supporting Memorandum. (AR Doc.
Nos. 14,21 and 22).
On November 19, 2012, the District Court conducted a hearing pertaining to
Shea's Second Motion for Reconsideration. (TR 30 - 45)

The District Court denied

Shea's Second Motion for Reconsideration, granted Kevic's Motion to Strike paragraph
3 of the Affidavit of Henry Madsen and granted Kevic's Motion for Attorney's fees. TR
30 - 45.

The Court issued written Orders reflecting those decisions. (CR 76 - 81).

Shea has appealed the District Court's decision denying her Second Motion for
Reconsideration. Shea has not appealed the Court's Order to strike a portion of Mr.
Madsen's Affidavit dated November 1, 2012 and the Court's decision awarding Kevic
attorney's fees.

C.

Concise Statement of the Facts.
On January 22, 2011, Ms. Shea entered the premises owned by Kevic to utilize the

carwash. As Shea's vehicle entered the carwash, an attendant for Kevic adjusted the
mirrors to allow her car to proceed through the carwash. After proceeding through the
carwash, Ms. Shea exited her vehicle to adjust her mirrors. As she was walking around
the front of the vehicle, Ms. Shea fell. Although her Complaint asserts that she slipped
on ice, Ms. Shea's deposition testimony reveals that the area was dry and she does not
know what she slipped upon.

II.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

The following is the Respondent's restated issues on appeal.
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1. Did the District Court err when it struck a portion of the Affidavit Henry
Madsen?
2. Did the District Court err when it granted Kevic's Motion for Summary
Judgment?
3. Did the District Court err when it denied the Plaintiff's First and Second
Motions for Reconsideration?
4. Should this Court award attorney's fees to Shea Corp. on appeal?
III.
A)

CROSS APPEAL - ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL

Did the District Court err when it denied Kevic's Motion to Strike Shea's

Affidavit which was filed after her deposition and after the Court had ruled on Kevic's
Motion for Summary Judgment and which contained information which is inconsistent
with her deposition testimony?
B) Should this Court award attorney's fees to Kevic on appeal?
VI. ATTORNEY'S FEES
Kevic is claiming attorney's fees on appeal pursuant to I.C.§ 12-121.
VII. ARGUMENT
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW - SUMMARY JUDGMENT
When reviewing an appeal for the granting of a Motion for Summary Judgment,
the appellate court applies the same standard used by the trial court in ruling on the
motion. Sadid v. Idaho State University, 151 Idaho 932, 936 (2011). The appellate
court construes all disputed facts, and draws all reasonable inferences from the record,
in favor of the non-moving party.

Id. Summary judgment is appropriate only if the
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evidence in the record and any admissions show that there is no genuine issue of
material fact regarding the issues stated in the pleadings and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
After the moving party has satisfied its burden, the non-moving party must then
come

forward

with

sufficient

admissible

evidence

identifying

specific

facts

demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Sherer v. Pocatello School

District, No. 25, 143 Idaho 486, 489-90 (2006); IRCP 56(e).

Such evidence may

consist of affidavits or depositions as well as other material based upon personal
knowledge which would have been admissible at trial. Id. at 490.

Although

circumstantial evidence can create a genuine issue for trial, a mere scintilla of evidence
is insufficient to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Sherer

supra at 489.
Affidavits supporting or opposing the Motion for Summary Judgment shall set
forth facts admissible in evidence and shall show affirmatively that the Affiant is
competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Gem State Insurance Company v.

Hutchinson, 145 Idaho 10, 13, 175 P.3d 172, 175 (Id. St. Ct. 2007). The admissibility
of evidence contained in affidavits and depositions in support of or in opposition to a
Motion for Summary is a threshold question to be answered before applying liberal
construction and reasonable inference rules to determine whether the evidence is
sufficient to create a genuine issue for trial. Gem State Insurance, supra at 13.
Summary Judgment is appropriate where the non-moving party bearing the burden of
proof fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element
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essential to the party's case.

Carnell v. Barker Management, Inc., 137 Idaho 322,

327,48 P.3d 651,656 (2002).
B. THE COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED PORTIONS OF HENRY MADSEN'S
AFFIDAVIT DATED AUGUST 2, 2012.
Prior to considering the merits of a motion for summary judgment, the Court must
address any evidentiary issues before applying the liberal standards for summary
judgment. When considering an evidentiary issue, this Court reviews evidentiary rulings
from the trial court for an abuse of discretion. Cramer v. Slater, 146 Idaho 868, 873,
204 P.3d 508, 513 (S.Ct. 2009). When this Court examines a trial court's discretionary
decision, it must be determined, "(1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue
as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the outer boundaries of its
discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable ... ; and (3) whether the
trial court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Cramer, supra at 873. In this
case, the evidentiary issue pertains to the District Court's decision striking paragraphs 3
and 5 of Mr. Madsen's Affidavit. Each issue will be addressed separately.

i) TESTIMONY PERTAINING TO PHOTOGRAPH (Paragraph 3).
Paragraph 3 of Mr. Madsen's Affidavit sought to introduce excerpts from the
deposition of Kevin Lett (principal of Kevic) with respect to a photograph that was taken
of the carwash.

At the time of Mr. Lett's deposition, Mr. Lett did not have any

information as to when the photograph was taken and/or by whom the photograph was
taken. Significantly, the photograph was not taken on the same day of the accident or
shortly after the accident.

There is no evidence, foundation or testimony which
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indicates that the photograph accurately depicts the premises in the same or similar
condition as the day of the accident.
Photographs are generally admissible when the witness identifies the photograph
and testifies that the photograph correctly portrays the scene or object. McKee v.

Chase, 73 Idaho 491, 253 P.2d 787; Handbook of Evidence for the Idaho Lawyer,
George M. Bell, 1987 (pg. 342).

Here, there is no evidence that the photograph

referenced in Mr. Madsen's Affidavit accurately reflected the conditions of the accident
site at the time of the accident. Shea has not laid any foundation necessary to support
the admissibility of the photograph. Significantly, the photograph appears to show that
the entire area in front of the carwash was wet which is directly contrary to and
inconsistent with the deposition testimony of Ms. Shea that the area around the carwash
was "amazingly dry" on the day of the accident. (Deposition of Irina Shea, pg. 24 L 1219, CR pg 42). Thus, the photograph is entirely inconsistent with the Plaintiff's testimony
and is deceptive.

A photograph which is deceptive is not admissible. Riksem v.

Hollister 96 Idaho 15523 P.2d 1361, 1362 (1974).
On page 18 of the Opening Brief, Shea concedes that the photograph does not
depict the condition of the premises on the day of the incident. Instead, she argues that
the photograph somehow depicts the probability that there could be a buildup of water
and/or ice. However, Shea's testimony is that there was no ice buildup. (Deposition of
Irina Shea, p. 30, LL. 20 -25). (CR 44)

Further, whether there is a probability of an ice

build-up on some other day is irrelevant and immaterial. (Rule 402 I.R.E.). The relevant
issue is the conditions which existed at the time of the accident. As noted below, Ms.
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Shea repeatedly testified that the area was dry. Thus, a photograph that depicts a wet
accident site is irrelevant, and inadmissible and the District Court properly excluded
paragraph 3 of Mr. Madsen's Affidavit.
ii)

PARAGRAPH 5 OF AFFIDAVIT LETTER
INSURANCE CARRIER IS INADMISSIBLE.

FROM

KEVIC'S

The other evidentiary issue pertains to Paragraph 5 of Mr. Madsen's Affidavit.
which sought to introduce a letter from Kevic's insurance carrier. The letter from the
insurance carrier is clearly hearsay (in fact, double hearsay). Hearsay is defined as "a
statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing,
offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." I.R.E. 801 (c); State v.
Gomez, 126 Idaho 700, 704, 889 P.2d 729, 733 (Ct.App.1994). Hearsay is inadmissible

unless otherwise provided by an exception in these rules or other rules of the Idaho
Supreme Court. I.R.E. 802.
Shea argues that the letter from Kevic's insurance carrier is a business record, a
hearsay exception contained in Rule 803(6) I.R.E. (Apparently Shea recognizes that the
letter constitutes hearsay and is inadmissible unless an appropriate exception is found).
There is no evidence that the letter was prepared by, sent to or received by Kevic.
Further, being a carwash, an accident investigation is not part of Kevic's regular
business activity. Thus, the letter is not a business record of Kevic and Shea's reliance
on Rule 803(6) is misplaced.
A review of the letter reveals that the letter contains "double hearsay".

The

author of the letter is relying upon photographs, statements and diagrams provided by
an "independent adjuster". Hearsay within hearsay is admissible under this rule provided
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each part of the combined statements falls within an exception to the rule. I.RE 805.
State v. Vivian, 129 Idaho 375, 378, 924 P.2d 637, 640 (1996). Shea has made no
attempt to identify any exception to the hearsay rule for the information which is
attributable to the independent adjuster.
The letter also violates Rule 411 I.RE. which precludes evidence of liability
insurance. This Court has repeatedly recognized that the general rule in Idaho that
evidence of insurance is inadmissible to prove negligence. Loza v. Arroyo Dairy, 137
Idaho 764, 53 P.3d 347 (Id. Ct. App. 2002).

The letter is also irrelevant (Rule 402

I.RE.) and the letter's prejudicial effect outweighs any probative value it may have.
(Rule 403 I.RE.). Thus, the District Court properly excluded the letter from Kevic's
Insurance carrier.
C. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT
TO KEVIC.
The essence of the Shea's Complaint is negligence. In Idaho, a cause of action
in negligence requires, 1). The existence of a duty, recognized by law, requiring the
defendant to conform to a certain standard of conduct; 2). A breach of that duty; 3). A
causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the resulting injury; and 4).
Actual loss or damage. Antim v. Fred Meyer Stores, Inc., supra, 150 Idaho, 774, 777,
251 P.3d 602, 604 (Ct.App. 2011). In Idaho, a person may be an invitee, licensee or
trespasser.

Holzheimer v. Johannesen, 125 Idaho 397, 399, 871 P.2d 814, 816

(1994). It is clear that Ms. Shea was an invitee. Under Idaho law:
It is well settled in this state that, to hold an owner or
possessor of land liable for injuries to an invitee caused by a
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dangerous condition existing on the land, it must be shown
that the owner or occupier knew, or in the exercise of
reasonable care should have known, of the existence of the
dangerous condition.

Antim v. Fred Meyer Stores, Inc., supra, at 778.
Shea's Complaint asserts that she slipped and fell on ice. However, Ms. Shea's
deposition testimony indicates that the ground was dry and she did not know what she
slipped upon.
Q.

In her deposition, Ms. Shea testified:
And when you were walking -- when you got out of your car, when you first
put your feet on the ground as you got out of the d river's seat, do you
recall wl1ether the ground was wet? Vv'hat was it?

A.

It was not wet.

Q.

Was it dry?

A.

It was dry. Everything was just amazingly dry just like right now.

(Deposition of Irina Shea, p. 24, LL. 12 -19, (CR p. 42).
Later, Ms. Shea testified that she did not know what caused her to slip and said:
Q.

When your left foot slipped, did you see what it slipped on?

A.

No.

(Deposition of Irina Shea, p. 26, LL. 19 - 2-1). (CR p. 43).
She later testified that the ground was dry.
Q.

Okay - - when you were getting out of the car and putting the tip money
and as you started to walk around, did you see any snow or ice on the
ground?

A.

There wasn't anything. There was just nice weather, and everything was
so dry. Nothing would suggest that it could be that.

(Deposition of Irina Shea, p. 30, LL. 20 -25). (CR p. 44).
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Ms. Shea also testified:
Q.

Okay. When you - - at any time before you fell did you see any ice in the
area of your car?

A.

No. I would be cautious.

(Deposition of Irina Shea, p. 31, LL. 15-17). (CR p. 44).
Similarly, Ms. Shea testified:
Q.

Okay. After this - - after you fell, did you notice whether there was any ice
around your car?

A.

No. It wasn't. It was so dry and nice.

Q.

As I understood your testimony earlier, as near as you could tell where
you walked was dry. Is that true?

A.

It was. Where I -I mean the spot where I fell.

Q.

Okay. It was dry?

A.

Because where-when I fell you can see on the picture there is never dry
in the front of the car wash.

Q.

But at the time-

A

It was dry everywhere else, but that spot."

(Deposition of Ms. Shea, p. 65, L. 21 - p. 66, L. 6). (CR 46-47).
Based on Shea's deposition testimony, it is readily apparent that she thought the
ground was dry and her testimony does not establish what caused her to slip.
Also, there is no evidence that Kevic knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care
should have known, of the existence of the alleged dangerous condition. Under Idaho
law, Shea has the burden to demonstrate that the owner or occupier knew, or in the
exercise of reasonable care should have known, of the existence of the dangerous
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condition. See Antim, supra, at 778. Shea has made no effort to establish that Kevic
knew of or reasonably should have known of the existence of an allegedly dangerous
condition where Shea fell. Thus, the District Court's decision granting Kevic's Motion for
Summary Judgment was appropriate and consistent with Idaho law.
In Giles v. Montgomery Ward, 94 Idaho 484, 491 P.2d 1256 (1971), the Court
noted that in order to establish negligence of the landowner as against an invitee, it
must be established that the landowner failed to keep the premises in a reasonably safe
condition, or failed to warn the invitee of hidden or concealed dangers of which the
owner or one in charge knew or should have known by exercise of reasonable care. In
the Giles case, the Court noted that the record only provided a suggestion that the floor
was slippery in a tiny spot.

The record lacked any evidence that the condition was

known to the owner or its employees or that it was of such a nature that the respondent
in exercising reasonable care for the safety of its customers should have been aware of
such a condition. Thus, the Giles court granted summary judgment.
The Giles case was recently cited with approval in Antim, supra. In Antim the
Court was facing a case where the plaintiff asserted that she tripped over a folded mat.
However, the plaintiff failed to present any evidence to demonstrate when the mat was
folded in order to establish how long it remained in a dangerous position prior to her fall.
Thus, the Antim court dismissed the plaintiff's claim.
In her Opening Brief, Shea refers this Court to McKinley v. Lyco Enterprises,
Inc., 111 Idaho 792, 727 P.2d 1220 (1986) asserting that because this case involved an
alleged slip on ice, there was a material question of fact. In McKinley, supra, the Court
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indicates that the plaintiff asserts (and apparently testified) that he slipped and fell on
ice. Here, however, Shea repeatedly testified that the ground was dry and she did not
know what she slipped on. Thus, the McKinley case is readily distinguishable from this
matter.
When comparing this matter to the McKinley case, Shea argues that this case is
about" 1) did the appellant slip on ice or mixture of ice and water and 2) did Kevic
"know or should he have reasonably known, there was ice or mixture of ice and water at
the end of his car wash." (Shea Opening Brief, pg. 13).

(The appropriate location is

the place of the accident, not the generic "end of the car wash.") Shea has the burden
of proof on both of those propositions. As noted above, Shea testified that the ground
was dry and that she did not know what she slipped on.

Further, Shea failed to

introduce any evidence that Kevic knew of should have known that the accident location
was icy and/or constituted a dangerous condition. Thus, when the facts of this case,
are reviewed using Shea's own analysis, the District Court properly granted Kevic's
Motion for Summary Judgment.
Shea also cited the case of Ball v. Blackfoot, 152 Idaho 673, 273 P.3d 1266
(2012) for the proposition that summary judgment should not have been granted.

In

Ball, supra, the injured party and her husband both apparently testified that there was
ice where the injured party fell. Thus, the substance that caused the fall was identified.
Again, Shea testified that the ground was dry and that she did not know what she
slipped on. Thus, the Ball decision is distinguishable.
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Shea also

that the District Court's reliance upon Antim v. Fred Meyer

Stores, Inc., 150 Idaho 774, 251 P.3d 602 (Id. Ct. App. 2011) was erroneous. Shea
attempts to create a "continuous condition" rule which somehow undermines and
distinguishes the Antim decision. Shea is attempting to argue that the operation of the
car wash creates an on-going situation where the ground is constantly wet and because
of the cold temperatures, there is always ice present.

However, Shea's testimony

defeats that argument when she testified that the ground was "amazingly dry", She was
asked, ".. after you fell, did you notice whether there was any ice around your car? She
responded, "No, It wasn't. It was so dry and nice." (Deposition of Irina Shea, p. 36, LL.
19-21). (CR p. 45).

Thus, Shea's testimony contradicts the "continuous condition"

theory being asserted and the District Court's reliance upon the Antim case was
entirely appropriate.
Shea cites to a general reference to the weather by Mr. Lett, it was "cold and icy"
That reference was not directed towards the exact location where Ms. Shea fell, but
instead, was generally directed at the car wash exit. That statement is insufficient to
create a material question of fact.

At best, Mr. Lett's statement constitutes a mere

scintilla of evidence which is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.
D. PORTIONS OF SHEA'S AFFIDAVIT SHOULD BE EXCLUDED.
After the Court granted Kevic's Motion for Summary Judgment, Shea filed a
Motion for Reconsideration supported by her own Affidavit.

(CR 32 - 39).

Kevic

asserts that a number of the statements contained within Shea's Affidavit were
inconsistent with her previous deposition.

Kevic filed a Motion and supporting
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documents to strike portions of the Affidavit of Irina Shea. (Specifically, paragraphs 5, 6,
7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17 of Shea's Affidavit) (CR 38-66) on the grounds
that the Affidavit was untimely, contrary to I.R.C.P. 56(c), the Court's own Order and are
inconsistent with Shea's previous deposition and are irrelevant and constitutes
speculation and conjecture.
Kevic acknowledges that the admissibility of Ms. Shea's Affidavit is an
evidentiary issue and is subject to the "abuse of discretion" standard. Kevic would
assert that the Affidavit was not filed in accordance with the timelines provided by IRCP
56 (c) which requires that "If the adverse party desires to serve opposing affidavits, he
must do so at least fourteen days prior to the date of the hearing." Here, the Affidavit of
Shea was submitted to this Court twelve days after the hearing. This Court has
recognized the Court's discretion to strike an affidavit for being untimely. Sun Valley
Potatoes, Inc. v. Rosholt, Robertson & Tucker, 133 Idaho 1, 5, 981 P.2d 236, 240
(1999).

During the hearing on August 23, 2012, Shea requested additional time to

submit supplemental affidavits. An objection was lodged and the District Court denied
Shea's Motion to file an Affidavit. (Transcript on Appeal, Hearing 8/23/2012, pg 20, L
13, - pg. 22 L.25). Kevic again asserts that the submission of the Affidavit is untimely,
contrary to the Court's ruling and contrary to IRCP 56(c).
Kevic acknowledges that the Affidavit was filed as part of Shea's Motion for
Reconsideration and that such Affidavits can be submitted for such motions under Rule
11 (2) IRCP. Kevic asserts that there is a conflict between Rule 56(c) and Rule 11 (2)
with regard to filing of affidavits.

In general, the rules pertaining to statutory
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construction, i.e., the more specific statute governs over a general statute.

Wheeler v.

Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare, 147 Idaho 257, 264, 207 P.3d 988, 995 (2008).
Here, the deadlines contained in Rule 56(c) should govern.

Kevic submits that if Shea

can avoid the time constraints contained in Rule 56(c) by filing her Affidavit as a part of
a Motion for Reconsideration, the timelines contained in Rule 56(c) are effectively
eliminated and Summary Judgment hearing becomes mechanism where the party
opposing summary judgment determines the Judge's thoughts and opinions and then
prepares an Affidavit to address the Court's concerns. In order to retain the value of the
timelines contained in Rule 56(c), Kevic submits that any affidavits which are submitted
as a part of a Motion for Reconsideration should be based upon information which was
not available at the time the Summary Judgment Motion was filed.

An unexcused

failure to present evidence at the time of the summary judgment is a valid basis for
denying a subsequent Motion for Reconsideration. Templet v. Hydrochem, 367 F. 3d
473, 479 (5 th Cir. 2004); also School District. No. 1J v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255,
1263 (9 th Cir. 1993) (the failure to file documents in an original motion or opposition
does not turn the late filed documents into "newly discovered evidence.")
Without waiving the timeliness argument, portions of Ms. Shea's affidavit are
contrary to her deposition testimony.

Idaho law does not allow affidavits to directly

contradict prior deposition testimony.

Such an affidavit may be disregarded on a

summary judgment motion. See Matter of Estate of Keeven, 126 Idaho 290, 298, 882
P.2d 457, 465 (Id. Ct.App. 1994).

Despite her deposition testimony that the area

around her car was "amazingly dry" and that there was no ice around the car, of Shea's
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Affidavit include statements

(,-r,-r 5, 7, 8, 11, 14) of purported water and/or ice. Such

statements are contrary to and contradict her previous deposition testimony.
Kevic submits that the Affidavit of Shea is a sham affidavit and should be
excluded. A sham affidavit which directly contradicts prior testimony may be
disregarded on a summary judgment motion, Tolmie Farms, Inc. v. J.R. Simplot Co.,
124 Idaho 607, 610, 862 P.2d 299, 302 (1993).

In Arregui v. Gael/gos-Main, 153

Idaho 801 291 P.3d 1000 (2012), this Court noted that it had not adopted the Sham
Affidavit Doctrine. The Sham Affidavit Doctrine which has been previously utilized by
the federal courts and Kevic submits that it should be applied to Ms. Shea's Affidavit.
The Sham Affidavit Doctrine precludes parties from creating an issue of fact by
submitting affidavits that contradict prior deposition testimony. Nelson v. City of Davis,
571 F.3d 924, 927-28 (9th Cir.2009).

The general rule in the Ninth Circuit is that a

party cannot create an issue of fact by an affidavit contradicting his prior deposition
testimony. Van Asdale v. International Game Technology, 577 F.3d 989, 998 (9th
Cir.2009).

However, the Ninth Circuit has limited the scope of the Sham Affidavit

Doctrine and in Van Asdale v. International Game Technology, 577 F.3d 989, 998
(9th Cir.2009), the Ninth Circuit noted, "the sham affidavit rule 'should be applied with
caution' " because the rule "is in tension with the principle that a court's role in deciding
a summary judgment motion is not to make credibility determinations or weigh
conflicting evidence." Van Asdale, supra at 998. Consistent with these concerns, the
Ninth Circuit has "fashioned two important limitations on a district court's discretion to
invoke the sham affidavit rule." First, "the inconsistency between a party's deposition
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testimony and subsequent affidavit must be clear and unambiguous to justify striking the
affidavit." Second, the Courts must "make a factual determination that the contradiction
was actually a 'sham.'" Id.
In Shea's Affidavit and in her Opening Brief, it asserts, "the appellant testified that
the front of her car had a coat on the ground of what appeared at first to be water."
(Shea Opening Brief, pg. 22.) Thus, her Affidavit asserts that the ground was wet, when
her deposition testimony repeatedly indicated that the ground was dry and that she did
not see what she slipped upon. (Deposition of Irina Shea, p. 26, LL. 19 - 21). (CR p.
43). Shea also testified that prior to falling she did not see any ice in the area of her car.
(Deposition of Irina Shea, p. 31, LL. 15-17). CR p. 44). Shea stated that after she fell,
she did not see any ice around her car. (Deposition of Irina Shea, p. 36, LL. 19-21). CR
p. 45). Thus, paragraph 17 of the Affidavit is inconsistent with her deposition testimony
and the first limitation identified by the Federal Court has been satisfied.
Shea's Affidavit was prepared and filed after the Court had issued its decision
regarding Summary Judgment after the timeline for filing such affidavits had expired and
was clearly intended to convince the District Court to reverse its decision. Thus, the
second limitation identified by the Federal Court has been satisfied and Ms. Shea's
Affidavit meets the requirements of a Sham Affidavit and should be stricken.
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DENIED BOTH OF SHEA'S MOTIONS
FOR RECONSIDERATION.
Shea has also appealed the District Court's decision denying Plaintiff's First
and Second Motions for Reconsideration, both of which were made pursuant to Rule
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11(b) I.R.C.P.

Kevic asserts that the Court's denial of Shea's Motions for

Reconsideration is consistent with Idaho law and should be upheld.
In reviewing Shea's Motions for Reconsideration, it is significant that the only
new information submitted with respect to either motion was Ms. Shea's Affidavit.
Without waiving its argument that Ms. Shea's Affidavit should have been stricken, Kevic
submits that even if the Affidavit is admitted or considered, the Court's ruling is still
correct.

The record is still devoid of any evidence that Kevic knew of the allegedly

dangerous condition and/or should have known of the existence of a dangerous
condition as required by Idaho law. Therefore, Shea can still not establish a prima facie
case and the Court properly denied both of Shea's Motions for Reconsideration.
F. ATTORNEY'S FEES
Both parties have claimed an award of attorney's fees on appeal.

A party is

entitled to attorney fees on appeal only if fees are authorized by statute, contract, or
court rule. Capps v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 149 Idaho 737, 744, 240 P.3d 583, 590
(2010). A citation to statutes and rules authorizing fees, without more, is insufficient.
Carroll v. MBNA America Bank, 148 Idaho 261, 270, 220 P.3d 1080, 1089 (2009). In
this case both Shea and Kevic assert that the opposing party's appeal was brought
frivolously. Attorney's fees can be awarded on appeal under that statute [12-121] only if
the appeal was brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation.
Gustaves v. Gus ta ves, 138 Idaho 64, 57 P.3d 775 (2002). An award of attorney's fees
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is appropriate if the appellant simply invites the appellate court to second-guess the trial
court on conflicting evidence. Gustaves at 782.
Shea's claim for attorney's fees is without merit. Here, the District Court granted
Summary Judgment based upon the deposition testimony of Ms. Shea, and that Shea
failed to produce any evidence that Kevic knew or should have known of the alleged
dangerous condition. Kevic's arguments are based upon Shea's deposition and sound
Idaho law. Thus, Kevic's arguments are not frivolous and Shea's claim for attorney's
fees on appeal should be denied.
Kevic asserts that it is entitled to attorney's fees for this appeal. An award of
attorney's fees pursuant to I.C. §12-121 is appropriate when the appellant simply invites
the appellate court to second-guess the trial on conflicting evidence. Bach v. Bagley,
148 Idaho 784, 797, 229 P.3d 1146, 1159 (2010). Here, Shea is asking this Court to
second guess the District Court on conflicting evidence and Kevic should be awarded
the attorney's fees which it has incurred in preparing and responding to Shea's appeal.

V. CONCLUSION
Shea's own deposition testimony establishes that the area where she slipped
was dry and/or she does not know what she slipped upon.

Further, Shea has not

introduced any evidence to show that Kevic knew of or should have known of the
allegedly hazardous condition. Thus, the District's Court's decisions granting Summary
Judgment to Kevic and denying Shea's Motions for Reconsideration should be upheld.
Because Shea is simply asking this Court to second-guess the District Court, Kevic
should be awarded attorney's fees on appeal pursuant to I.C. §12-121.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this __ day of July, 2013.
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